

Building Brains for Bodies

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Abstract

We describe a project to capitalize on newly available levels of computational resources in order to understand human cognition. We are building an integrated physical system including vision, sound input and output, and dextrous manipulation, all controlled by a continuously operating large scale parallel MIMD computer. The resulting system will learn to "think" by building on its bodily experiences to accomplish progressively more abstract tasks. Past experience suggests that in attempting to build such an integrated system we will have to fundamentally change the way artificial intelligence, cognitive science, linguistics, and philosophy think about the organization of intelligence. We expect to be able to better reconcile the theories that will be developed with current work in neuroscience.

Keywords: robotics, artificial intelligence, human cognition, humanoids, androids

I Project Overview

We are building an integrated physical humanoid robot including active vision, sound input and output, dextrous manipulation, and the beginnings of language, all controlled by a continuously operating large scale parallel MIMD computer. This project capitalizes on newly available levels of computational resources in order to meet two goals: an engineering goal of building a prototype general purpose flexible and dextrous autonomous robot and a scientific goal of understanding human cognition. While there have been previous attempts at building kinematically humanoid robots, none have attempted the embodied construction of an autonomous intelligent robot; the requisite computational power simply has not previously been available.

The robot is coupled into the physical world with high bandwidth sensing and fast servocontrolled actuators, allowing it to interact with the world on a human time scale. A shared time scale opens up new possibilities for how humans use robots as assistants, and allows us to design the robot to learn new behaviors under human feedback such as human manual guidance and vocal approval. One of our engineering goals is to determine the architectural requirements sufficient for an enterprise of this type. Based on our earlier work on mobile robots, our expectation is that the constraints may be different from those that are often assumed for large scale parallel computers. If ratified, such a conclusion

could have important impacts on the design of future sub-families of large machines.

Recent trends in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, and sociology are converging on an anti-objectivist, body-based approach to abstract cognition. Where traditional approaches in these fields advocate an objectively specifiable reality — brain-in-a-box, independent of bodily constraints — these newer approaches insist that intelligence cannot be separated from the subjective experience of a body. The humanoid robot provides the necessary substrate, for a serious exploration of the subjectivist-body-based-hypotheses.

There are numerous specific cognitive hypotheses that could be implemented in one or more of the humanoids that will be built during the project. For example, we can vary the extent to which the robot is programmed with an attentional preference for some images or sounds, and the extent to which the robot is programmed to learn to selectively attend to environmental input as a by-product of goal attainment (e.g., successful manipulation of objects) or reward by humans. We can compare the behavioral result of constructing a humanoid around different hypotheses of cortical representation, such as *coincidence detection* versus *interpolating memory* versus *sequence seeking in counter streams* versus *time-locked multi-regional retroactivation*. In the later years of the project we can connect with theories

of consciousness by demonstrating that humanoids designed to continuously act on immediate sensory data (as suggested by Dennett's *multiple drafts* model) show more human-like behavior than robots designed to construct an elaborate world model.

The act of building and programming behavior-based robots forces us to face not only issues of interfaces between traditionally assumed modularities, but even the idea of modularity itself. By reaching across traditional boundaries and tying together many sensing and acting modalities, we will quickly illuminate shortcomings in the standard models, shedding light on formerly unrealized sociologically shared, but incorrect, assumptions.

2 Background: The Power of Enabling Technology

An enabling technology — such as the brain that we are building — has the ability to revolutionize science. A recent example of the far-reaching effects of such technological advances is the field of mobile robotics. Just as the advent of cheap and accessible mobile robotics dramatically altered our conceptions of intelligence in the last decade, we believe that current high performance computing technology makes the present an opportune time for the construction of a similarly significant integrated intelligent system.

Over the last eight years there has been a renewed interest in building experimental mobile robot systems that operate in unadorned and unmodified natural and unstructured environments. The enabling technology for this was the single chip micro-computer. This made it possible for relatively small groups to build serviceable robots largely with graduate student power, rather than the legion of engineers that had characterized earlier efforts along these lines in the late sixties. The accessibility of this technology inspired academic researchers to take seriously the idea of building systems that would work in the real world.

The act of building and programming behavior-based robots fundamentally changed our understanding of what is difficult and what is easy. The effects of this work on traditional artificial intelligence can be seen in innumerable areas. Planning research has undergone a major shift from static planning to deal with “reactive planning.” The emphasis in computer vision has moved from recovery from single images or canned sequences of images to active — or animate — vision, where the observer is a participant in the world controlling the imaging process in order to simplify the processing requirements. Generally, the focus within AI has

shifted from centralized systems to distributed systems. Further, the work on behavior-based mobile robots has also had a substantial effect on many other fields (e.g., on the design of planetary science missions, on silicon micromachining, on artificial life, and on cognitive science). There has also been considerable interest from neuroscience circles, and we are just now starting to see some bi-directional feedback there.

The grand challenge that we wish to take up is to make the quantum leap from experimenting with mobile robot systems to an almost humanoid integrated head system with saccading foveated vision, facilities for sound processing and sound production, and two compliant, dextrous manipulators. The system will be immobile. The enabling technology is massively parallel computing; our brain has large numbers of processors dedicated to particular sub-functions, and interconnected by a fixed topology network.

3 Scientific Questions

Building an android, an autonomous robot with humanoid form, has been a recurring theme in science fiction from the inception of the genre with Frankenstein, through the moral dilemmas infesting positronic brains, the human but not really human C3PO and the ever present desire for real humanness as exemplified by Commander Data. Their bodies have ranged from that of a recycled actual human body through various degrees of mechanical sophistication to ones that are indistinguishable (in the stories) from real ones. And perhaps the most human of all the imagined robots, HAL-9000, did not even have a body.

While various engineering enterprises have modeled their artifacts after humans to one degree or another (e.g., WABOT-II at Waseda University and the space station tele-robotic servicer of Martin-Marietta) no one has seriously tried to couple human like cognitive processes to these systems. There has been an implicit, and sometimes explicit, assumption, even from the days of Turing (see Turing (1970)ⁱ) that the ultimate goal of artificial intelligence research was to build an android. There have been many studies relating brain models to computers (Berkeley 1949), cybernetics (Ashby 1956), and artificial intelligence (Arbib 1964), and along the way there have always been semi-popular scientific books discussing the possibilities of actually building real ‘live’ androids (Caudill (1992) is, perhaps the most recent).

This paper concerns a plan to build a series of robots that are both humanoid in form, humanoid in

function, and to some extent humanoid in computational organization. While one cannot deny the romance of such an enterprise, we are realistic enough to know that we can but scratch the surface of just a few of the scientific and technological problems involved in building the ultimate humanoid given the time scale and scope of our project, and given the current state of our knowledge.

The reason that we should try to do this at all is that for the first time there is plausibly enough computation available. High performance parallel computation gives us a new tool that those before us have not had available and that our contemporaries have chosen not to use in such a grand attempt. Our previous experience in attempting to emulate much simpler organisms than humans suggests that in attempting to build such systems we will have to fundamentally change the way artificial intelligence, cognitive science, psychology, and linguistics think about the organization of intelligence. As a result, some new theories will have to be developed. We expect to be better able to reconcile the new theories with current work in neuroscience. The primary benefits from this work will be in the striving, rather than in the constructed artifact.

3.1 Minds

The traditional approach taken in artificial intelligence to building intelligent programs has affectionately been dubbed ‘Good Old Fashioned AI’, or GOFAI (Haugeland 1985). It is epitomized in the modularity arguments of Fodor (1983) and in the physical symbol system hypothesis of Newell & Simon (1981). These approaches reduce AI to the problem of constructing a brain-in-a-box symbolic manipulator which would act intelligently if given appropriate connection to a robot (or other perceptuo-motor system). Still further modularization leads to independent work on such tasks as natural language processing, planning, learning, and commonsense reasoning (e.g., Allen, Hendler & Tate 1990, Hobbs & Moore 1985 or Brachman & Levesque 1985). We have argued (Brooks 1991a) that much of GOFAI was shaped by the technological resources available to its researchers. High performance computing and communications gives us a new opportunity to re-shape attempts at building intelligent systems.

Many modern theories are at odds with GOFAI. For example, Minsky (1986) suggests that the mind is a society of smaller agents competing and cooperating. Kinsbourne (1988) and Dennett (1991) argue that there is no place in the brain where consciousness resides. Linguists and psycholinguists have argued that the long-fashionable separation of language into

the separate components of grammar and semantics is a fiction convenient for symbolic formulation but not useful for advancing our understanding of the real diversity of language phenomena (Langacker 1987, Harris 1991). Brooks (1991a) proposes that human-level intelligence can be built without a single central representation of the world. Stein (1994) argues that all of cognition can be seen as the recapitulation — through imagination — of action in the world.

Many other theories of mind (e.g., Searle 1992, Edelman 1987, Edelman 1989, Edelman 1992) argue against the traditional AI notion of categorical representation, and instead for a more situated model of computation. Unfortunately these and others are flawed by fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of computation and the uses of abstraction, usually centered around formal models of Turing machines and sometimes their interaction with Gödel's theorem. Such arguments were long ago successfully debunked (Arbib 1964), but continue to resurfaceⁱⁱ.

At the other end of the spectrum is connectionism. Computational scientists have worked with simple abstractions of the brain for many years in two main waves, one in the sixties (Rosenblatt 1962, Minsky & Papert 1969) and a second in the eighties (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986). Unfortunately, most of this work is concerned with local aspects of the problem, rather than giving insight into how a complete system might be organizedⁱⁱⁱ. There have been recent attempts to bridge the gap in more serious ways between computation and neuroscience — in particular Churchland & Sejnowski (1992) — but still the gap is too large to consider neural-based approaches for a system of the scope we are proposing. Dennett & Kinsbourne (1992) are working to relate a neuroscientific theory of consciousness, *dominant focus* (Kinsbourne 1988), to a philosophical analysis of mind. A major intent of our work is to extend that analysis to the point of its being an implementable theory on our humanoids.

Recent work in neuropsychology has produced surprising results. Lesion studies, e.g. those by Damasio & Damasio (1989) and McCarthy & Warrington (1990), indicate that the modularity of storage and access in the human brain is dramatically different from what our intuitions — as exemplified by both cognitive science and GOFAI — tell us. For instance it is clear that a picture of a dolphin provides immediate access to a different set of representations at a different level of generalization from those prompted by the verbal stimulus, ‘dolphin’. In a normal person these representations are cross-linked, but in patients with certain lesions these cross-links

may be destroyed for particular classes of entities (e.g., for animals, but not tools)^{iv}. Likewise Newcombe & Ratcliff (1989) demonstrate multiple parallel channels of control dependent on the task, rather than, say, a single centralized finger control module for each finger. There is a grounding of motor control in the different types of interactions the agent has with the world^v. Nor is the control of attention centralized, as illustrated by studies of unilateral neglect (Kinsbourne 1987), but rather it is a matter of competition between brain systems.

The argument is that the human brain stores things not only by category but also by modality — the ‘representations’ are grounded in the sensory modality used to learn the information. Kuipers & Byun (1991), Mataric (1992b) and Stein (1994) implement limited forms of this body-based representation in mobile robots. Drescher (1991), too, uses environmental interaction to construct representation. Still, each of these projects was limited by the relative poverty of the sensory suite. In this project, we are using the neuropsychological evidence to build a far more sophisticated instantiation of the body-based theory of representation and to examine it relative to traditional theories of modularity.

There is also evidence that what appear to be reasonably well understood sensory channels within the brain are much more complex than we currently imagine. As one example, there is the effect known as *blindsight*, where despite the lack of pieces or a whole visual cortex, both humans and animals can perceive, perhaps not consciously, certain things within their visual field (Weiskrantz 1986, Braddick et al. 1992). There has been some recent argument that these phenomena may be produced by partially intact visual cortex (Fendrich, Wessinger & Gazzaniga 1992), but even that would still call into question the arguments of Marr (1982) — long used in computer vision — that the purpose of the vision system is to reconstruct a 3-dimensional representation of what is out in the world.

The notion that embodiment in the physical world is important to creating human-like intelligence is not at all new. Even the 1947 paper of Turing (1970) is quite concerned about this point. Later, Simon (1969) discusses a similar point using as a parable an ant walking along the beach. He points out that the complexity of the behavior of the ant is more a reflection of the complexity of its environment than its own internal complexity and speculates that the same may be true of humans.

The idea that our very modularity and internal organization depends on our ways of physically interacting with the world is carried even further in a

series of philosophical arguments (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). Their central hypothesis is that all of our thought and language is grounded in physical patterns generated in our sensory and motor systems as we interact with the world. In particular these physical bases of our reason and intelligence can still be discerned in our language as we ‘confront’ the fact that much of our language can be ‘viewed’ as physical metaphors, ‘based’ on our own bodily interactions with the world.

We have been taking these notions seriously as we build and program our humanoids, using physical interactions as a basis for higher level cognitive-like behaviors. We have already demonstrated a simple version of these ideas using currently available “insect-level” robotics (Stein 1994).

3.2 Symbols and Mental Representation

The *physical symbol system hypothesis* construed as appropriate manipulation of a physical symbol system, maintains that any physical symbol system can implement intelligent behavior. As a consequence, it says that symbols provide a layer of abstraction that hides the details of perceptual and motor processes.

To understand the difficulties that the physical symbol system hypothesis presents for our task, we might examine another similar abstraction. It is common to regard digital design as concerned solely with binary digits — discrete ones and zeros. Indeed, this digital abstraction allows the use of boolean logic to synthesize the combinational circuits out of which our computational elements are built. By hiding the details of analog voltages that constitute our systems, the digital abstraction facilitates reasoning about and construction with these elements. However, the fact that the digital abstraction is useful for combinational synthesis does not mean that it suffices for all purposes. Indeed, for certain elements — such as a bipolar switch — it may be necessary to look beneath the digital abstraction to understand the interactions of electrical components — e.g., to debounce the switch. Further, certain portions of the resulting system — such as the debouncing circuitry — may *never* be interpretable directly in terms of the digital abstraction.

Approaches that rely on the physical symbol-system hypothesis cannot constitute complete explanations of intelligence, precisely because they abstract away the details of symbols’ implementation. In order for a brain-in-a-box to connect to a body, all symbols must be derivable from sensory stimuli; but in addition, there are

portions of the system — such as the bouncy switch — that cannot be seen from the symbolic side of the abstraction. Thus, while symbolic approaches to cognition may provide us with tremendous insight as to how intelligence might work once we have symbols, it can neither tell us how to construct those symbols nor assist us in the identification and manipulation of the non-symbolic portion of our system.

At the opposite extreme are several nonsymbolic approaches to cognition. From connectionism to reactive systems to artificial life, these systems operate on stimuli much closer to “real” sensory input, often using difficult-to-comprehend processes to compute appropriate actions based on these stimuli. Because they are closer to actual sensation, these approaches have had marked success in certain areas (e.g., video-game playing (Agre & Chapman 1987); navigation (Pomerleau 1991); “insect” intelligence (Connell 1990, Angle & Brooks 1990)). However, because they lack symbols or any comparable abstraction, these systems are often inscrutable. A corollary is the difficulty that practitioners have had in transferring knowledge gained in the construction of one system to the design of the next. Because there is little explicit structure, these systems generally defy description by abstraction.

We believe that the most fruitful approach will be one that builds on both of these traditions (e.g., Rosenschein & Kaelbling 1986, Kuipers & Byun 1991, Drescher 1991, Stein 1994, Yanco & Stein 1993). Just as the digital abstraction is useful for the designer of combinational circuits, so the symbolic abstraction will be invaluable for the designer of cognitive components. However, combinational circuits are built out of raw voltages, not out of ones and zeros: the binary digits are in the mind of the designer. Similarly, the symbolic abstraction is a crucial tool in the analysis and synthesis of our humanoids; but we do not necessarily expect these symbols to appear explicitly in the humanoid’s head.

Thus, both of these pieces inform our approach to representation. However, it is not at all clear that a single “symbol” (in the conventional sense, e.g., ‘dolphin’) will have a unitary representation (e.g., in the human brain the image of a dolphin may be stored separately from categorical knowledge about dolphins as sea creatures). As a result, we need to broaden the conventional definitions. We expect to use lower level modules — derived, e.g., from more ‘reactive’ approaches — to come up with appropriate responses to stimuli. From these, we identify patterns of behavior that represent generalizations —

proto-symbols — and use these to establish reasoning that appears to be more “symbolic”.

There is an argument that certain components of stimulus-response systems are “symbolic.” For example, if a particular neuron fires — or a particular wire carries a positive voltage — whenever something red is visible, that neuron — or wire — may be said to “represent” the presence of something red. While this argument may be perfectly reasonable as an observer’s explanation of the system, it should not be mistaken for an explanation of what the agent in question believes. In particular, the positive voltage on the wire does not *represent* the presence of red to *the agent*; the positive voltage is the presence of something red as far as the robot is concerned.

The digital abstraction is not a statement about how things are; it is merely a way of viewing them. A combinational circuit may be *analyzed* in terms of boolean logic, but it is voltages, not a collection of ones and zeros. (Or, perhaps, it is electrons moving in a particular way.) At best, the digital abstraction tells us that the combinational circuit is amenable to analysis in term of ones and zeros; but it does not change the reality of what is there.

Similarly, the utility of the symbolic abstraction in analyzing rational behavior does not indicate that there are actually entities corresponding to symbols in the brain. Rather, it indicates that the brain — or, more, likely, portions of the brain (viz. the debounced switch) — are amenable to analysis in symbolic terms. It does not change the fact that everything in the brain is (sub-symbolic) neural activity; nor does the equation of brain function with neural activity rule out the utility of a symbolic explanation.

In building a humanoid, we begin at this sensory level. All intelligence is grounded in computation on sensory information or on information derived from sensation. However, some of this computation abstracts away from explicit sensation, generalizing, e.g., over similar situations or sensory inputs. Through sensation and action, the humanoid will experience a conceptualization of space: “up,” “down,” “near,” “far,” etc. We hypothesize that at this point it will be useful for observers to describe the behavior of the humanoid in symbolic terms. (“It put the red blocks together.”) This is the first step in representation.

The next step involves a jump from the view of symbols as a convenient but post hoc explanation (i.e., for an observer) to a view in which symbols, somehow, *appear to the agent* to exist inside the

agent's head. This second step is facilitated by language, one of the tools that allows us to become observers of ourselves. This is the trick of consciousness: the idea that "we" exist, that one part of us is observing another.

Although there is good evidence that consciousness is anything but a simple phenomenon (i.e., that the reality is far more complex than our post hoc reconstruction of it) (Springer & Deutsch 1981), it almost certainly does have some of the properties that we attribute to it.

With language, symbols become more than merely a post hoc explanation by others of the workings of our own brains; symbols become our own explanation to ourselves. It is this ability to distance ourselves from our own symbols that gives rise to our illusions of consciousness (Bickhard 1991, Bickard 1993). How can we produce these "symbolic" associations? The same processes that produce responses from sensory inputs can be stimulated internally. For example, Kosslyn (1994) has demonstrated that portions of the visual cortex are implicated in visual imagery, suggesting precisely this sort of self-stimulation. Stein (1994) takes a similar approach to add cognitive capacity to a behavior-based robot.

We can summarize our approach to representation as follows: Stimulus-response systems abstract away from particular inputs to treat large classes of inputs similarly. This begins the "generalization" of particular stimuli into complex reactions and the external appearance of categorization, or proto-symbols. Next, these abstractions begin to be produced without resorting to actual sensory inputs. Symbol-like behavior results, but without instantiating symbols directly.

4 High Performance Computing

While traditional parallel processors are designed to act like fast serial computers, we are addressing an inherently parallel task. Indeed, while for most of computer science the translation to parallel hardware has imposed additional complexity (and, indeed, much current research is devoted to minimizing the overhead of this translation), we anticipate a significant simplification of our task in virtue of the parallel hardware available.

Much of the work on high performance computation is benchmarked in terms of how it speeds up numerical simulations of physical phenomena (Cypher, Ho, Konstantinidou & Messina 1993). In these domains there is a well defined set of computations that given a valid set of initial

conditions are guaranteed to be well behaved in some sense, generating a sufficiently accurate simulation of how events will unfold over time. Data is collected along the way, and a final summary of how the modeled system evolved over time is the result of the computation. The model of a computation is very much that of an algorithm that is given input data and, after some suitable computation, outputs some data. As a result, much of the research into high performance parallel computers is concerned with how to present a shared memory that can be accessed quickly by all processors, leading to the need for local caching schemes and high speed switching networks; how to make sure that all such views of memory are consistent, leading to the need for handling cache coherence; and how to dynamically balance the load on all processors, given the implicit understanding that the goal of the whole job is to complete the computation as quickly as possible.

In our "problem" the constraints are very different. By the nature of the system we do not need to migrate processes, do not need a shared memory, and do not need to dynamically redirect messages. Simple "hard wired" messages networks should suffice, with memory only local to each processor. The goal is not to "finish" a computation as quickly as possible but instead to pass the data through a process in a bounded amount of time so that the next data that the world presents to the system can flow through without getting blocked or lost. There is no end to a computation or final result; all is continuously being computed and recomputed, and actions in the world are the "outputs" of the system. But the computation is not simply linear in ordering. There must be many pathways between sensors and actuators, some with very different latencies, each one contributing to some aspect of the resulting behavior of the system.

We need high performance and parallel computing in order to guarantee the bounds on computation time of any particular step in the processes. We will push on the organization of computation to do useful tasks directly in the real world, and will be pushing in a direction which should lead to inherently simpler-to-construct massively parallel computers. The applications of this sort of processing will be wide ranging and indeed may well become pervasive throughout our society.

Our problem is more one of maintenance of activity rather than achievement of a single solution to a problem.

Our humanoid robot is situated in a real world over which it has very little control. There are people present, moving about, changing the physical environs of the humanoid, responding to actions of

the humanoid, and generating spontaneous behaviors themselves. The task for the humanoid will be to interact with these ultimately unpredictable agents in a coherent way. It receives a continuous large and rich stream of input data of which it must make sense, relating it to past experiences and future possibilities in the world. It is a participant in this world and must act with appropriate speed and grace.

5 Hardware and Software Experimental Platforms

We have extensive experience in building mobile robots. The authors have been directly involved in the design and construction of over 35 different designs for mobile robots, and with multiple instances of many of these types of robots — over 100 robots in total.

In that previous work with mobile robots, we started out thinking we would build one mobile robot that would be a platform for research for a generation of graduate students (Brooks 1986). That soon changed as we realized three things: (1) trying to design everything into one robot caused too many compromises in our research goals as early experiments soon pointed to multiple different sensor/actuator suites which needed to be explored, (2) graduate students working on somewhat separate thesis projects needed their own robots if they were to do extensive multi-hundred hours of operation experiments, rather than simple validation demonstrations in controlled environments as were often conducted in many research projects (Brooks 1991b) and (3) by continually re-engineering our designs we gradually built more robust robots with longer mean times between catastrophic failures^{vi}. Building many robots over a short period of time led to rapid increases in performance over a diverse set of robot morphologies (Yanco & Stein 1993, Torrance 1994, Brooks 1986, Connell 1987, Horswill & Brooks 1988, Brooks 1989, Connell 1990, Angle & Brooks 1990, Mataric 1992b, Mataric 1992a, Ferrell 1993, Horswill 1993; see Brooks 1990b for an overview). At the same time, a common software system (Brooks 1990a) was developed which ran on many different processors, but provided a common environment for programming all the diverse robots. Brooks (1990b) gives a mid-course review of some of those robots.

In this project too, we expect that there will be great benefits from building the humanoid repeatedly over the life of the project and from running the software on multiple computer architectures, taking advantage in both cases of technological developments that will occur independently of this project. At the same time we are following a learning

curve, increasing our engineering sophistication and the inherent robustness of the systems we build.

5.1 Brains

Our goal is to take advantage of the new availability of massively parallel computation in dedicated machines. We need parallelism because of the vast amounts of processing that must be done in order to make sense of a continuous and rich stream of perceptual data. We need parallelism to coordinate the many actuation systems that need to work in synchrony (e.g., the ocular system and the neck must move in a coordinated fashion at time to maintain image stability) and which need to be servoed at high rates. We need parallelism in order to have a continuously operating system that can be upgraded without having to recompile, reload, and restart all of the software that runs the stable lower level aspects of the humanoid. And finally we need parallelism for the cognitive aspects of the system as we are attempting to build a “brain” with more capability than can fit on any existing single processor.

But in real-time embedded systems there is yet another necessary reason for parallelism. It is the fact that there are many things to be attended to, happening in the world continuously, independent of the agent. From this comes the notion of an agent being situated in the world. Not only must the agent devote attention to perhaps hundreds of different sensors many times per second, but it must also devote attention “down stream” in the processing chain in many different places at many times per second as the processed sensor data flows through the system. The actual amounts of computation needed to be done by each of these individual processes is in fact quite small, so small that originally we formalized them as augmented finite state machines (Brooks 1986), although more recently we have thought of them as real-time rules (Brooks 1990a). They are too small to have a complete processor devoted to them in any machine beyond a CM-2, and even there the processors would be mostly idle. A better approach is to simulate parallelism in a single conventional processor with its own local memory.

For instance, Ferrell (1993) built a software system to control a 19 actuator six legged robot using about 60 of its sensors. She implemented it as more than 1500 parallel processes running on a single Phillips 68070. (It communicated with 7 peripheral processors which handled sensor data collection and 100 Hz motor servoing.) Most of these parallel processes ran at rates varying between 10 and 25 Hertz. Each time each process ran, it took at most a few dozen instructions before blocking, waiting either for the passage of time or for some other process to send it a

message. Clearly, low cost context switching was important.

The underlying computational model used on that robot — and with many tens of other autonomous mobile robots we have built — consisted of networks of message-passing augmented finite state machines. Each of these AFSMs was a separate process. The messages were sent over predefined ‘wires’ from a specific transmitting to a specific receiving AFSM. The messages were simple numbers (typically 8 bits) whose meaning depended on the designs of both the transmitter and the receiver. An AFSM had additional registers which held the most recent incoming message on any particular wire. This gives a very simple model of parallelism, even simpler than that of CSP Hoare (1985). The registers could have their values fed into a local combinatorial circuit to produce new values for registers or to provide an output message. The network of AFSMs was totally asynchronous, but individual AFSMs could have fixed duration monostables which provided for dealing with the flow of time in the outside world. The behavioral competence of the system was improved by adding more behavior-specific network to the existing network. This process was called layering. This was a simplistic and crude analogy to evolutionary development. As with evolution, at every stage of the development, the systems were tested. Each of the layers was a behavior producing piece of network in its own right, although it might implicitly rely on the presence of earlier pieces of network. For instance, an explore layer did not need to explicitly avoid obstacles, as the designer knew that a previous avoid layer would take care of it. A fixed priority arbitration scheme was used to handle conflicts.

On top of the AFSM substrate we used another abstraction known as the Behavior Language, or BL (Brooks 1990a), which was much easier for the user to program with. The output of the BL compiler was a standard set of augmented finite state machines; by maintaining this compatibility all existing software could be retained. When programming in BL the user has complete access to full Common Lisp as a metalanguage by way of a macro mechanism. Thus the user could easily develop abstractions on top of BL, while still writing programs which compiled down to networks of AFSMs. In a sense, AFSMs played the role of assembly language in normal high level computer languages. But the structure of the AFSM networks enforced a programming style which naturally compiled into very efficient small processes. The structure of the Behavior Language enforced a modularity where data sharing was restricted to smallish sets of AFSMs, and whose only

interfaces were essentially asynchronous 1-deep buffers.

In the humanoid project much of the computation, especially for the lower levels of the system, will naturally be of a similar nature. We expect to perform different experiments where in some cases the higher level computations are of the same nature and in other cases the higher levels will be much more symbolic in nature, although the symbolic bindings will be restricted to within individual processors. We need to use software and hardware environments which give support to these requirements without sacrificing the high levels of performance of which we wish to make use.

5.1.1 Software. For the software environment we have a number of requirements:

- There should be a good software development environment.
- The system should be completely portable over many hardware environments, so that we can upgrade to new parallel machines over the lifetime of this project.
- The system should provide efficient code for perceptual processing such as vision.
- The system should let us write high level symbolic programs when desired.
- The system language should be a standardized language that is widely known and understood.

In summary, our software environment should let us gain easy access to high performance parallel computation.

We have chosen to use Common Lisp (Steele Jr. 1990) as the substrate for all software development. This gives us good programming environments including type checked debugging, rapid prototyping, symbolic computation, easy ways of writing embedded language abstractions, and automatic storage management. We believe that Common Lisp is superior to C (the other major contender) in all of these aspects.

The problem then is how to use Lisp in a massively parallel machine where each node may not have the vast amounts of memory that we have become accustomed to feeding Common Lisp implementations on standard Unix boxes.

We have a long history of building high performance Lisp compilers (Brooks, Gabriel &

Steele Jr. 1982), including one of the two most common commercial Lisp compilers on the market-, Lucid Lisp (Brooks et al. 1986).

Recently we have developed L (Brooks 1993, a retargetable small efficient Lisp which is a downwardly compatible subset of Common Lisp. When compiled for a 680W based machine the load image (without the compiler) is only 140 Kbytes, but includes multiple values, strings, characters, arrays, a simplified but compatible package system, all the "ordinary" aspects of format, backquote and comma, setf etc. full Common Lisp lambda lists including optionals and keyword arguments, macros, an inspector, a debugger, defstruct (integrated with the inspector), block, catch, and throw, etc., full dynamic closures, a full lexical interpreter, floating point, fast garbage collection, and so on. The compiler runs in time linear in the size of an input expression, except in the presence of lexical closures. It nevertheless produces highly optimized code in most cases. L is missing flet and labels, generic arithmetic, bignums, rationals, complex numbers, the library of sequence functions (which can, be written within L) and esoteric parts of format and packages.

The L system is an intellectual descendent of the dynamically retargetable Lucid Lisp compiler (Brooks et al. 1986) and the dynamically retargetable Behavior Language compiler (Brooks 1990a). The system is totally written in L with machine dependent backends for retargeting. The first backend is for the Motorola 68020 (and upwards) family, but it is easily retargeted to new architectures. The process consists of writing a simple machine description, providing code templates for about 100 primitive procedures (e.g., fixed precision integer +, *, =, etc., string indexing CHAR and other accessors, CAR, CDR, etc.), code macro expansion for about 20 pseudo instructions (e.g. procedure call, procedure exit, checking correct number of arguments, linking CATCH frames, etc.) and two corresponding sets of assembler routines which are too big to be expanded as code templates every time, but are so critical in speed that they need to be written in machine language, without the overhead of a procedure call, rather than in Lisp (e.g., CONS, spreading of multiple values on the stack, etc.). There is a version of the I/O system which operates by calling C routines (e.g., fgetchar, etc.; this is how the Macintosh version of L runs) so it is rather simple to port the system to any hardware platform we might choose to use in the future.

Note carefully the intention here: L is to be the delivery vehicle running on the brain hardware of the humanoid, potentially on hundreds or thousands of small processors. Since it is fully downward

compatible with Common Lisp however, we can carry out code development and debugging on standard work stations with full programming environments (e.g., in Macintosh Common Lisp, or Lucid Common Lisp with Emacs 19 on a Unix box, or in the Harlequin programming environment on a Unix box). We can then dynamically link code into the running system on our parallel processors.

There are two remaining problems: (1) how to maintain super critical real-time performance when using a Lisp system without hard ephemeral garbage collection, and (2) how to get the level of within-processor parallelism described earlier.

The structure of L's implementation is such that multiple independent heaps can be maintained within a single address space, sharing all the code and data segments of the Lisp proper. In this way super-critical portions of a system can be placed in a heap where no consing is occurring, and hence there is no possibility that they will be blocked by garbage collection.

The Behavior Language (Brooks 1990a) is an example of a compiler which builds special purpose static schedulers for low overhead parallelism. Each process ran until blocked and the syntax of the language forced there to always be a blocking condition, so there was no need for pre-emptive scheduling. Additionally the syntax and semantics of the language guaranteed that there would be zero stack context needed to be saved when a blocking condition was reached. We have built a new scheduling system with L to address similar issues in this project. To fit in with the philosophy of the rest of the system it has a dynamic scheduler so that new processes can be added and deleted as a user types to the Lisp listener of a particular processor. Reasonably straightforward data structures keep these costs to manageable levels. It was rather straightforward to build a phase into the L compiler which recognizes the situations described above. Thus it was straightforward to implement a set of macros which provides a language abstraction on top of Lisp which provides all the functionality of the Behavior Language and which additionally lets us have dynamic scheduling. A pre-emptive scheduler is used in addition, as it would be difficult to enforce a computation time limit syntactically when Common Lisp is essentially available to the programmer — at the very least the case of the pre-emptive scheduler having to strike down a process is useful as a safety device, and acts as a debugging tool for the user to identify time critical computations which are stressing the bounded computation style of writing. In other cases static analysis is able to determine maximum stack requirements for a particular process, and so heap allocated stacks are usable.

The software system so far described is being used to implement crude forms of 'brain models', where computations will be organized in ways inspired by the sorts of anatomical divisions we see occurring in animal brains. Note that we are not building a model of a particular brain, but rather using a modularity inspired by such components as visual cortex, auditory cortex, etc., with further modularity within and across these components, e.g., a particular subsystem to implement the vestibulo-ocular response (VOR).

Thus besides on-processor parallelism we need to provide a modularity tool that packages processes into groups and limits data sharing, between them. Each package resides on a single processor, but often processors host many such packages. A package that communicates with another package should be insulated at the syntax level from knowing whether the other package is on the same or a different processor. The communication medium between such packages will again be 1-deep buffers without queuing or receipt acknowledgment- any such acknowledgment will need to be implemented as a backward channel, much as we see throughout the cortex (Churchland & Sejnowski 1992). This packaging system can be implemented in Common Lisp as a macro package.

5.1.2 Computational Hardware. The computational model presented in the previous section is somewhat different from that usually assumed in high performance parallel computer applications. Typically (Cypher et al. 1993) there is a strong bias on system requirements from the sort of benchmarks that are used to evaluate performance. The standard benchmarks for modern high performance computation seem to be Fortran code for hydrodynamics, molecular simulations, or graphics rendering. We are proposing a very different application with very different requirements; in particular we require real-time response to a wide variety of external and internal events, we require good symbolic computation performance, we require only integer rather than high performance floating point operations^{vii}, we require delivery of messages only to specific sites determined at program design time, rather than at run-time, and we require the ability to do very fast context switches because of the large number of parallel processes that we intend to run on each individual processor.

The fact that we do not need to support pointer references across the computational substrate means that we can rely on much simpler, and therefore higher performance, parallel computers than many other researchers — we do not have to worry about a

consistent global memory, cache coherence, or arbitrary message routing. Since these are different requirements than those that are normally considered, we have to make some measurements with actual programs before we can make an intelligent off the shelf choice of computer hardware.

In order to answer some of these questions we have built a zero-th generation parallel computer. It is being built on a very low budget with off the shelf components wherever possible (a few fairly simple printed circuit boards need to be fabricated). The processors are 16 Mhz Motorola 68332s on a standard board built by Vesta Technology. These plug 16 to a backplane. The backplane provides each processor with six communications ports (using the integrated timing processor unit to generate the required signals along with special chip select and standard address and data lines) and a peripheral processor port. The communications ports are hand-wired with patch cables, building a fixed topology network. (The cables incorporate a single dual ported RAM (8 K by 16 bits) that itself includes hardware semaphores writable and readable by the two processors being connected.)

Background processes running on the 68332 operating system provide sustained rate transfers of 60 Hz packets of 4 Kbytes on each port, with higher peak rates if desired. These sustained rates do consume processing cycles from the 68332. On non-vision processors we expect much lower rates will be needed, and even on vision processors we can probably reduce the packet frequency to around 15 Hz. Each processor has an operating system, L, and the dynamic scheduler residing in 1M of EPROM. There is 1M of RAM for program, stack and heap space. Up to 256 processors can be connected together.

Up to 16 backplanes can be connected to a single front end processor (FEP) via a shared 500 K baud serial line to a SCSI emulator. A large network of 68332s can span many FEN if we choose to extend the construction of this zero-th prototype. Initially we use a Macintosh as a FEP Software written in Macintosh Common Lisp on the FEP provides disk I/O services to the 68332's, monitor status and health packets from them, and provides the user with a Lisp listener to any processor they might choose.

The zero-th version uses the standard Motorola SPI (serial peripheral interface) to communicate with up to 16 Motorola 6811 processors per 68332. These are a single chip processor with onboard EEPROM (2 K bytes) and RAM (256 bytes), including a timer system, an SPI interface, and 8 channels of analog to digital conversion. We are building a small custom board for this processor that includes opto-isolated

motor drivers and some standard analog support for sensors.

There are certain developments on the horizon within the MIT Artificial Intelligence Lab which we expect to capitalize upon in order to dramatically upgrade our computational systems for early vision, and hence the resolution at which we can afford to process images in real time. The first of these, will be a somewhat similar distributed processing system based on the much higher performance Texas Instrument C40, which comes with built in support for fixed topology message passing. In late '95 we expect to be able to make use of the Abacus system, a bit level reconfigurable vision front-end processor being built under ARPA sponsorship which promises Tera-op performance on 16 bit fixed precision operands. Both these systems will be simply integrable with our zero-th order parallel processor via the standard dual-ported RAM protocol that we are using.

5.2 Bodies

As with the computational hardware, we are also currently engaged in building a zero-th generation body for early experimentation and design refinement towards more serious constructions within the scope of this project. We are presently limited by budgetary constraints to building an immobile, armless, deaf, torso with only black and white vision.

In the following subsections we outline the constraints and requirements on a full scale humanoid body and also include where relevant details of our zero-th level prototype.

5.2.1 Eyes. There has been quite a lot of recent work on animate vision using saccading stereo cameras, most notably at Rochester (Ballard 1989, Coombs 1992), but also more recently, at many other institutions, such as Oxford University.

The humanoid needs a head with high mechanical performance eyeballs and foveated vision if it is to be able to participate in the world with people in a natural way. Even our earliest heads will include two eyes, with foveated vision, able to pan and tilt as a unit, and with independent saccading ability (three saccades per second) and vergence control of the eyes. Fundamental vision based behaviors will include a visually calibrated vestibular-ocular reflex, smooth pursuit, visually calibrated saccades, and object centered foveal relative depth stereo. Independent visual systems will provide peripheral and foveal motion cues, color discrimination, human face pop-outs, and eventually face recognition. Over the course of the project, object recognition based on

“representations” from body schemas and manipulation interactions will be developed. This is completely different from any conventional object recognition schemes, and can not be attempted without an integrated vision and manipulation environment as we propose.

The eyeballs need to be able to saccade up to about three times per second, stabilizing for 250 ms at each stop. Additionally the yaw axes should be controllable for vergence to a common point and drivable in a manner appropriate for smooth pursuit and for image stabilization as part of a vestibulo-ocular response (VOR) to head movement. The eyeballs do not need to be force or torque controlled but they do need good fast position and velocity control. We have previously built, a single eyeball, A-eye, on which we implemented a model of VOR, ocular-kinetic response (OKR) and saccades, all of which used dynamic visually based calibration (Viola 1990).

Other active vision systems have had both eyeballs mounted on a single tilt axis. We will begin experiments with separate tilt axes but if we find that relative tilt motion is not very useful we will back off from this requirement in later versions of the head.

The cameras need to cover a wide field of view, preferably close to 180 degrees, while also giving a foveated central region. Ideally the images should be RGB (rather than the very poor color signal of standard NTSC). A resolution of 512 by 512 at both the coarse and fine scale is desirable.

Our zero-th version of the cameras are black and white only. Each eyeball consists of two small lightweight cameras mounted with parallel axes. One gives a 115 degree field of view and the other gives a 20 degree foveated region. In order to handle the images in real time in our zero-th parallel processor we subsample the images to be 128 by 128 which is much smaller than the ideal.

Later versions of the head will have full RGB color cameras, wider angles for the peripheral vision, much finer grain sampling of the images, and perhaps a colinear optics set up using optical fiber cables and beam splitters. With more sophisticated high speed processing available we will also be able to do experiments with log-polar image representations.

5.2.2 Ears, Voice. Almost no work has been done on sound understanding, as distinct from speech understanding. This project will start on sound understanding to provide a much more solid processing base for later work on speech input. Early

behavior layers will spatially correlate noises with visual events, and spatial registration will be continuously self-calibrating. Efforts will concentrate on using this physical cross-correlation as a basis for reliably pulling out interesting events from background noise, and mimicking the cocktail party effect of being able to focus attention on particular sound sources. Visual correlation with face pop-outs, etc., will then be used to be able to extract human sound streams. Work will proceed on using these sound streams to mimic infant's abilities to ignore language-dependent irrelevances. By the time we get to elementary speech we will therefore have a system able to work in noisy environments and accustomed to multiple speakers with varying accents.

Sound perception will consist of four high-quality microphones. (Although the human head uses only two auditory inputs, it relies heavily on the shape of the external ear in determining the vertical component of directional sound source.) Sound generation will be accomplished using a single speaker.

Sound is critical for several aspects of the robot's activity. First, sound provides immediate feedback for motor manipulation and positioning. Babies learn to find and use their hands by batting at and manipulating toys that jingle and rattle. Adults use such cues as contact noises — the sound of an object hitting the table — to provide feedback to motor systems. Second, sound aids in socialization even before the emergence of language. Patterns such as turn-taking and mimicry are critical parts of children's development, and adults use guttural gestures to express attitudes and other conversational cues. Certain signal tones indicate encouragement or disapproval to all ages and stages of development. Finally, even preverbal children use sound effectively to convey intent; until our robots develop true language, other sounds will necessarily be a major source of communication.

5.23 Torsos. In order for the humanoid to be able to participate in the same sorts of body metaphors as are used by humans, it needs to have a symmetric human-like torso. It needs to be able to experience imbalance, feel symmetry, learn to coordinate head and body motion for stable vision, and be able to experience relief when it relaxes its body. Additionally, the torso must be able to support the head, the arms, and any objects they grasp.

The torsos we build will initially have a three-degree-of-freedom hip, with the axes passing through a common point, capable of leaning and twisting to any position in about three seconds — somewhat slower than a human. The neck will also have three

degrees of freedom, with the axes passing through a common point which will also lie along the spinal axis of the body. The head will be capable of yawing at 90 degrees per second — less than peak human speed, but well within the range of natural human motions. As we build later versions we expect to increase these performance figures to more closely match the abilities of a human.

Apart from the normal sorts of kinematic sensors, the torso needs a number of additional sensors specifically aimed at providing input fodder for the development of bodily metaphors. In particular, strain gauges on the spine can give the system a feel for its posture and the symmetry of a particular configuration, plus a little information about any additional load the torso might bear when an arm picks up something heavy. Heat sensors on the motors and the motor drivers will give feedback as to how much work has been done by the body recently, and current sensors on the motors will give an indication of how hard the system is working instantaneously.

Our zero-th level torso is roughly 18 inches from the base of the spine to the base of the neck. This corresponds to a smallish adult. It uses DC motors with built-in gearboxes. The main concern we have is how quiet it will be, as we do not want the sound perception system to be overwhelmed by body noise.

Later versions of the torsos will have touch sensors integrated around the body, will be more compliant motion, will be quieter, and will need to provide better cabling ducts so that the cables can all feed out through a lower body outlet.

5.24 Arms. The eventual manipulator system will be a compliant multi-degree-of-freedom arm with a rather simple hand. (A better hand would be nice, but hand research is not yet at a point where we can get an interesting, easy-to-use, off-the-shelf hand.) The arm will be safe enough that humans can interact with it, handing it things and taking things from it. The arm will be compliant enough that the system will be able to explore its own body — for instance, by touching its head system — so that it will be able to develop its own body metaphors.

We want the arms to be very compliant yet still able to lift weights of a few pounds so that they can interact with human artifacts in interesting ways. Additionally, we want the arms to have redundant degrees of freedom (rather than the six seen in a standard commercial robot arm), so that in many circumstances we can 'burn' some of those degrees of freedom in order to align a single joint so that the joint coordinates and task coordinates very nearly

match. This will greatly simplify control of manipulation. It is the sort of thing people do all the time: for example, when bracing an elbow or the base of the palm (or even their middle and last two fingers) on a table to stabilize the hand during some delicate (or not so delicate) manipulation. Our zeroth version arms have six degrees of freedom and a novel spring-based transmission system to introduce passive compliance at every joint.

The hands in the first instances will be quite simple; devices that can grasp from above relying heavily on mechanical compliance — they may have as few as one degree of control freedom.

More sophisticated, however, will be the sensing on the arms and hands. We will use forms of conductive rubber to get a sense of touch over the surface of the arm, so that it can detect (compliant) collisions it might participate in. As with the torso there will be liberal use of strain gauges, heat sensors and current sensors so that the system can have a 'feel' for how its arms are being used and how they are performing.

We also expect to move towards a more sophisticated type of hand in later years of this project. Initially, unfortunately, we will be forced to

use motions of the upper joints of the arm for fine manipulation tasks. More sophisticated hands will allow us to use finger motions, with much lower inertias, to carry out these tasks.

6 Development Plan

We plan on modeling the brain at a level above the neural level, but below what would normally be thought of as the cognitive level.

We understand abstraction well enough to know how to engineer a system that has similar properties and connections to the human brain without having to model its detailed local wiring. At the same time it is clear from the literature that there is no agreement on how things are really organized computationally at higher or modular levels, or indeed whether it even makes sense to talk about modules of the brain (e.g., short term memory, and long term memory) as generative structures.

Nevertheless, we expect to be guided, or one might say inspired, by what is known about the high level connectivity within the human brain (although admittedly much of our knowledge actually comes from macaques and other primates and is only extrapolated to be true of humans, a problem of




Fig. 1. Development plan.

concern to some brain scientists (Crick & Jones 1993)). Thus for instance we expect to have identifiable clusters of processors which we will be able to point to and say they are performing a role similar to that of the cerebellum (e.g., refining gross motor commands into coordinated smooth motions), or the cortex (e.g., some aspects of searching generalization/specialization hierarchies in object recognition (Ullman 1991)).

At another level we will directly model human systems where they are known in some detail. For instance there is quite a lot known about the control of eye movements in humans (again mostly extrapolated from work with monkeys) and we will build in a vestibulo-ocular response (VOR), OKR, smooth pursuit, and saccades using the best evidence available on how this is organized in humans (Lisberger 1988).

A third level of modeling or inspiration that we will use is at the developmental level. For instance once we have some sound understanding developed, we will use models of what happens in child language development to explore ways of connecting physical actions in the world to a ground of language and the development of symbols (Bates 1979, Bates, Bretherton & Snyder 1988), including indexical (Lempert & Kinsbourne 1985) and turn-taking behavior, interpretation of tone and facial expressions and the early use of memorized phrases.

Since we will have a number of faculty, and graduate students working on concurrent research projects, and since we will have a number of concurrently active humanoid robots, not all pieces that are developed will be intended to fit together exactly. Some will be incompatible experiments in alternate ways of building subsystems, or putting them together. Some will be pushing on particular issues in language, say, that may not be very related to some particular other issues, e.g., saccades. Also, quite clearly, at this stage we can not have a development plan fully worked out for the lifetime of the project, as many of the early results will change the way we think about the problems and what should be the next steps.

In figure 1, we summarize our current plans for developing software systems on board our series of humanoids. In many cases there will be earlier work off-board the robots, but to keep clutter down in the diagram we have omitted that work here.

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Notes

- ⁱ Different sources cite 1947 and 1948 as the time of writing, but it was not, published until long after his death.
- ⁱⁱ A more egregious version of this is (Penrose 1989) who not only makes the same Turing-Gödel error, but then in a desperate attempt to find the essence of mind and applying the standard methodology of physics, namely to find a simplifying underlying principle, resorts to an almost mystical reliance on quantum mechanics.
- ⁱⁱⁱ There are exceptions to this: for instance, the work of Beer (1990); but that is restricted to insect level cognition.
- ^{iv} One particular patient (McCarthy & Warrington 1988) when shown a picture of a dolphin, was able to form sentences using the word 'dolphin' and talk about its habitat, its ability to be trained, and its role in the US military. When verbally asked what a dolphin was, however, he thought it was 'either a fish or a bird.' He had no such discrepancies in knowledge when the subject was, for example, a wheelbarrow.
- ^v For instance, some patients can not exercise conscious control over their fingers for simple tasks, yet seem unimpaired in threading a needle, or playing the Piano. Furthermore in some cases selective drug induced suppression shows ways in which many simple reflexes combine to give the appearance of a centralized will producing globally coherent behavior (Teitelbaum, Pellis & Pellis 1990).
- ^{vi} This observation parallels the developments in digital computers, where mean time between failures in the 1950's was in the 20 minute range, extending to periods of a week in the 1970's, and now typically we are not surprised when our workstations run for months without needing to be rebooted — this increase in robustness was bought with many hundreds of iterations of the engineering cycle.
- ^{vii} Consider the dynamic range possible in single signal channels in the human brain and it soon becomes apparent that all that we wish to do is certainly achievable with neither span of 600 orders of magnitude, or 47 significant binary digits.